Lecture 6: The Five Universals, Term-Meaning Relations, and the Foundations of Definition

This lecture develops the section of al-Akhdari’s al-Sullam al-Munawraq on the five universals (al-kulliyat al-khams, الكليات الخمس). These are the basic logical tools used for forming sound tasawwur (تصور), meaning a clear concept of what something is before making judgments about it. The five universals are jins (genus), fasl (differentia), arad amm (common accident/property), naw (species), and khassah (specific property). Together, they function like the traditional Aristotelian-Porphyrian toolkit for classification: they help us say what a thing shares with others, what makes it distinct, and what belongs to it essentially or non-essentially.

The first universal, jins (جنس), is a broad essential category said of many things that differ in reality, such as “animal” said of humans, horses, and gazelles. Fasl (فصل) is the essential differentiating feature, such as rationality for the human being. The instructor emphasized that natiq (ناطق), often translated “rational,” is not merely the ability to speak; it refers to the intellect’s ability to abstract meanings and move among intelligibles. This is why a mute person remains natiq: rationality is not reducible to vocal communication.

The lecture then distinguished arad amm (عرض عام), a common property external to the essence, from khassah (خاصة), a property also external to the essence but specific to one species. Movement by will is a common property because humans share it with many animals. By contrast, the human capacities for knowledge, writing meaningfully, or laughter were used as examples of specific properties: not because no animal can imitate sounds or marks, but because the human capacity involves knowledge, meaning, and rational abstraction. The class also clarified the difference between jins and naw: “animal” is a genus relative to “human,” while “human” is a species relative to individual humans like Zayd, Amina, or Ibrahim. Individual persons are juz'i (particulars), not species.

A further section classified the relationship between terms (alfaz, ألفاظ) and meanings (maani, معاني). A term may apply equally across its instances, called tawatu (تواطؤ), as “human being” applies equally to all humans. Or it may apply unequally or by degrees, called tashakuk (تشاكك), as “white,” “tall,” or even “existence” may apply in different strengths or modes. The instructor contrasted this with ishtirak (اشتراك), where one word has multiple distinct meanings, like “eye” meaning a bodily organ, the eye of a storm, or a spring of water. The opposite is taraduf (ترادف), where different words indicate the same meaning, like insan and bashar for human being.

The lecture also introduced talab (طلب) and khabar (خبر), two broad categories of compound expressions. A khabar is a statement that can be true or false, such as “So-and-so is Egyptian.” A talab is a request, command, or appeal that is not itself true or false, such as “Give me the pen.” Talab is further divided according to hierarchy: from superior to inferior it is amr (command), from inferior to superior it is dua (request/supplication), and between equals it is iltimas (advice or peer request). This framework is important in logic, rhetoric (balagha), theology, and legal theory (usul al-fiqh).

Finally, the lecture distinguished kull (كل, whole), kulli (كلي, universal), juz (جزء, part), and juz'i (جزئي, particular), then moved into the beginning of definitions. A kull is a whole made up of parts, while a kulli is a universal meaning that can apply to many instances, even if no instance exists outside the mind. This matters in theology because a phrase like “partner of the Creator” is meaningful as a universal concept, yet necessarily impossible in reality. The instructor then introduced the layered theory of definition: the thing defined, the property that distinguishes it, and the expression or mental concept that points to that property. This prepares for the next major topic: how proper definitions are constructed and how faulty definitions generate confusion in argumentation.